Evidence Issues In Indian Law Cases by Fielding, Taylor S.
American Indian Law Journal 
Volume 2 Issue 1 Article 2 
May 2017 
Evidence Issues In Indian Law Cases 
Taylor S. Fielding 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/ailj 
 Part of the Evidence Commons, and the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Fielding, Taylor S. (2017) "Evidence Issues In Indian Law Cases," American Indian Law Journal: Vol. 2 : Iss. 
1 , Article 2. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/ailj/vol2/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Publications and Programs at Seattle 
University School of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in American Indian Law Journal by 
an authorized editor of Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact 
coteconor@seattleu.edu. 




EVIDENCE ISSUES IN INDIAN LAW CASES 
 




 “American archaeology has reached the point where its very 
survival depends upon close interaction with the realm of law.”1 This 
statement appeared in a report of a seminar in law in archaeology in 1977. 
Granted, this seminar was held just a few years after the United States v. 
Diaz2 case, where the Ninth Circuit reversed a conviction under the 
Antiquities Act of 1906,3 and ruled the Act itself was unconstitutionally 
vague. Ironically, however, it would be thirteen more years before the 
anthropological world was shaken through the passage of the Native 
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA),4 which 
would precipitate extensive litigation between tribes, museums, and 
federal government agencies. 
 
Jack F. Trope and Walter R. Echo-Hawk write in their historical 
overview of NAGPRA that it was meant to emphasize human rights 
origins, and to address one of the flagrant violations of the civil rights of 
Native Americans – proper respect for the burial of their dead.5 Trope and 
Echo-Hawk also write that the passage of NAGPRA was seen by many in 
Congress as a logical extension of the federal government’s trust 
responsibility to Native American, Hawaiian, and Alaskan Native groups.6 
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NAGPRA outlines a series of actions that are required if 
archaeological investigations inadvertently uncover Native American 
remains.7 These include: cessation of activities, notification of supervisory 
personnel or the state historic preservation officer, and consultation with 
“affiliated or potentially affiliated” Native American groups.8 NAGPRA also 
directs museums and other federally-funded institutions9 to inventory and 
attempt to determine the cultural affiliation of Native American remains, 
funerary objects, and objects of cultural patrimony in their collections.10 If 
cultural affiliation could be established, notification is then required of the 
appropriate federally recognized tribal group that may request 
repatriation.11 
 
 In the thirty years since the report on the interaction of law and 
archaeology seminar, practitioners of all of the anthropology sub-
disciplines have served as expert witnesses in numerous cases, both civil 
and criminal. Often, anthropologists are called as experts to provide the 
court with information on the culture and history of Native American 
groups, rather than Native American groups informing the court 
themselves. This paper will examine whether anthropologists are really 
more qualified to give testimony about Native American groups, while 
tribal member testimony, especially about the tribe’s oral history, is 
marginalized. Part I of this paper will examine some of the problems 
identified with applying the Daubert factors to “soft science,” and will 
examine the disparity in cases where anthropologists have testified. Part I 
will also discuss whether anthropologists, specifically archaeologists, can 
even provide complete expert testimony without talking to tribal members. 
Part II of this paper will examine how the testimony of tribal members 
regarding oral history could be admitted into court. Part III of this paper will 
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I. EXACTLY WHO ARE ANTHROPOLOGISTS AND WHAT DO THEY STUDY? 
 
 Anthropologists, like ice cream, come in various flavors. 
Anthropology is so diverse that practitioners often specialize in one area.12 
Thus, not every anthropologist will have knowledge of Native American 
cultures, traditions or life ways, just as not every medical doctor would 
know how to treat a heart condition. Since the major topics of study are 
cultural and biological, the field is sometimes dichotomized in this 
manner.13 The broad field of anthropology is traditionally broken down into 
four subfields: cultural anthropologists, anthropological linguists, physical 
or biological anthropologists, and archaeologists.14 
 
Cultural anthropologists study people and their cultures.15 Cultural 
anthropology is also sometimes called social anthropology,16 although 
some see the term social anthropology as describing those who 
specifically study social relations.17 Cultural anthropologists as a group 
contain additional variation: ethnographers, who study the specific cultural 
practices of a certain group of people; and ethnologists,18 who use the 
data recorded by the former to make general comparisons between 
cultures.19 Linguists are a division of anthropologists who study 
language,20 work closely with cultural anthropologists and are considered 
by some to be a subdiscipline of cultural anthropology.21 
 
Physical or biological anthropologists study the bones and other 
physical features of the human body.22 Archaeologists excavate and 
examine “the material remains of extinct cultures.”23 Archaeologists’ work 
is often focused on the structures and items left behind in a certain 
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geographic area.24 Archaeologists may work closely with physical 
anthropologists if human remains are present.25 Unfortunately for modern 
archaeologists, this subfield still carries some taint from its past, as the 
first “archaeologists” were in fact “the looters and grave robbers in 
antiquity.”26 
 
A. Soft Science, Meet the Daubert Factors 
 
 Anthropologists and archaeologists are considered social scientists, 
and despite the difference between these and other soft science fields 
when compared to hard science fields of the natural and physical 
sciences, the same evidentiary rules apply in court. 
 
 As part of the United States Supreme Court ruling that Federal Rule 
of Evidence 702 replaced the Frye standard for the Federal Rules of 
Evidence in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,27 the Supreme 
Court outlined five criteria courts could employ in their preliminary 
assessment of the reliability of scientific testimony. These factors are: 
 
1. whether the theory offered had been tested; 
2. whether it had been subjected to peer review and publication; 
3. the known rate of error;  
4. the existence of standards and controls; and 
5. whether the theory is generally accepted in the scientific 
community.28 
 
 The application of these factors – especially the known rate of error 
criteria – work well when dealing with hard sciences such as chemistry 
and physics. However, the difficulty comes in applying the Daubert factors 
to non-scientific expert opinion testimony, where instead of a particular 
scientific methodology, an expert’s opinion is based upon experience or 
training.29 After Daubert, courts had mixed opinions as to whether the 
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Daubert factors were applicable to non-scientific expert opinions.30 The 
Supreme Court answered the question definitively in 1999: 
 
Daubert's general holding – setting forth the trial judge's general 
“gatekeeping” obligation – applies not only to testimony based on 
“scientific” knowledge, but also to testimony based on “technical” 
and “other specialized” knowledge. . . .  [A] trial court may consider 
one or more of the more specific factors that Daubert mentioned 
when doing so will help determine that testimony's reliability. But, 
as the Court stated in Daubert, the test of reliability is “flexible,” and 
Daubert's list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively 
applies to all experts or in every case.31 
  
 Thus, as a result of the Supreme Court’s decision, the Daubert 
factors apply to testimony presented by soft scientists, such as 
anthropologists. Some practitioners in the field of archaeology itself even 
question “whether the field of archaeology can ever be pursued as a 
science.”32 While some archaeological methodologies are based on 
scientific principles, these methodologies may not be as objective and 
scientific in practice as they are in theory.33 For example, in physical 
anthropology, the use of precise measurements in craniometric analysis34 
seems objective and scientific.35 In reality, however, these variables “tend 
to exhibit a high degree of intra- and inter-observer error.”36 In addition, 
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these measurements can be perverted into supporting incorrect 
conclusions, as they do in craniology.37 Moreover, the use of the 
geological method of stratigraphy suffers from the same variability. For 
instance, the number of stratigraphic layers that can be identified in the 
side-wall of an excavation unit38 can depend on who is viewing the side-
wall as well as lighting and soil conditions. The technique of radiocarbon 
(C14) dating, developed in the late 1940s, fulfills the Daubert factors of a 
well-tested theory that has been peer reviewed and accepted by the 
scientific community.39 However, even this relatively scientific method 
does not always hold up to the Daubert factor of replication to receive the 
same result, as other hard science tests would. As an example, evidence 
of this is present in the Bonnichsen case, where the results of radiocarbon 
dating on bone samples varied greatly between the 1996 and 1999 tests.40  
 
 Thus, the objectiveness and scientific characteristics of 
anthropology clearly fall to the softer side of the spectrum, even for more 
scientific methodologies such as radiocarbon dating. Anthropology is not 
alone in this plight, as historians and linguists are similarly situated. How 
effectively the Daubert factors apply to soft science fields, such as history 
and linguistics, and how successfully the methodologies used in those soft 
science fields would hold up against the Daubert inquiry is open to debate. 
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 Courts experience difficulty in applying the Daubert standards to 
historical scholarship, according to one author.41 In her analysis, 
Schneider found that the testability factor is difficult to apply without an 
objective historian.42 Specifically, the publication and peer review factor is 
not necessarily helpful in weeding out “junk history.”43 Additionally, the 
potential rate of error, the third Daubert factor, is “completely inapplicable 
as a standard for evaluating historical scholarship.”44 The existence of 
standards is also difficult to apply due to a lack of a “widely recognized 
code of conduct.”45 Lastly, general acceptance could be deceiving, since 
general acceptance may be roughly gauged by scholarly works, yet they 
are a poor test for methodological reliability.46 
 
 Alternatively, linguistics “should fare quite well” in response to a 
Daubert inquiry, at least according to two legal scholars.47 Scholars cite 
the fact that “[l]inguistics is a robust field that relies heavily on peer-
reviewed journals for dissemination of work.”48 While acknowledging that 
multiple theories may exist in the field of linguistics, Tiersma and Solan 
assert the facts would be immutable: 
 
“while there may be disagreement as to why we understand a given 
linguistic structure to have a particular range of meanings, the fact 
of the range of meanings should not normally be controversial.”49 
 
 Alternatively, the presence and even the use of multiple theories in 
data analysis have been advocated in some fields as an inquiry into “how 
findings are affected by different assumptions and fundamental 
premises.”50 The issue of multiple theories in a field of study is also 
present in anthropology, and cannot be easily dismissed. Anthropologist 
Kerry D. Feldman asks the question, “to what extent are we, or can we be, 
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competent expositors of all of them?”51 Feldman, who was an expert 
witness in litigation involving an Alaskan Native Village corporation, noted 
“both sides found scientific data to support their claims” which he feels 
“forces the anthropologist to examine even more closely the nature of 
‘facts’ in relation to personally held ‘theories’ which purport to explain 
those facts.”52 
 
Feldman further describes “a fundamental incongruence” between 
the research methods of social science and legal evidence rules.53 
Specifically, the ethnographies produced by anthropologists are entirely 
based on oral narratives that would be deemed hearsay in court.54 
However, another scholar, Lawrence Rosen, advocates that 
anthropologists acting as expert witnesses may actually be able to glean 
something from their experience.55 Rosen writes that participation in the 
Indian Claims Commission (ICC) hearings may have resulted in scholars’ 
altering their classification systems in their studies to more closely parallel 
the categories being used by the ICC.56 
 
Additionally, Rosen cites an overhaul of anthropological 
methodologies.57 The conclusion to Rosen is obvious, “it is clear that 
participation in legal cases has had a reciprocal effect on anthropological 
thinking.”58 Even if Rosen is correct, and some members of that 
generation of anthropologists did alter their practices based on the ICC 
experiences, it is doubtful that this change would make anthropology more 
robust if tested against the Daubert factors. 
 
Even if anthropologists altered their methodologies based on legal 
experiences, it does not change the fact that the Daubert factors were 
originally developed for a hard science field, that of medicine and 
pharmaceuticals. Thus, many of the Daubert factors are easily applied to 
laboratory research where most if not all variables can be controlled, and 
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an experiment repeated to achieve the same result. While each of the 
subfields of anthropology has established methods and procedures 
designed to eliminate error, it remains that anthropological research has a 
subjective quality that cannot be eliminated. In addition, it is clear that 
some anthropological methodologies, such as the gathering of oral 
narratives and histories to compose ethnographies, did not change. As 
Feldman points out, this methodology is part of the problem, since the 
source material is deemed unreliable by courts.59 
 
B. Anthropologists Take the Stand as Expert Witnesses 
 
 This paper will focus on cases where anthropologists have testified 
as expert witnesses. In order to sufficiently narrow the topic of discussion, 
the cases examined involved Native American groups and can be easily 
divided into two categories: treaty right cases and cultural resources 
cases. 
 
1. Treaty Rights Cases 
 
 The cases classified here as treaty rights cases arose in United 
States district courts and were both state challenges to the validity and 
possible state regulation of Native Americans’ off-reservation fishing 
rights. 
 
 The first case, United States v. Washington,60 adjudicated the 
validity of off-reservation treaty rights in rivers and off-shore waters of 
Western Washington Native American groups. Due to the trust 
relationship between Native Americans and the federal government, the 
suit was brought by the United States against the State of Washington. 
The Washington case also addressed the issue of state regulation of 
Native Americans’ off-reservation fishing activities, with the court holding 
that the power of general regulation was with the tribes and not within the 
state’s police powers. However, the court did allow for the State to impose 
some regulations on off-reservation Native American fishing, but only 
where the State did not discriminate against Native American fishermen, 
and where the State could show the restrictions were “reasonable and 
necessary to conservation.”61 
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 The beginning of the section of the Washington opinion discussed 
the pre-treaty role of fishing in the lives of northwest Native Americans, 
and focused on a classic situation seen in civil cases: dueling experts. The 
anthropologists presented reports on “Indian life in the case area at and 
prior to the time of the treaties, including the treaty councils, Indian groups 
covered by the treaties, the purposes of the treaties and the Indians' 
understanding of treaty provisions.”62 The court found the testimony and 
reports of the plaintiffs’ anthropologist more credible. Specifically, the court 
said, “nothing in [the anthropologist appearing for the plaintiffs’] report and 
testimony was controverted by any credible evidence in the case.”63 The 
use of oral histories is not even mentioned in the opinion until the next to 
last finding of fact in that section, three pages later in the reporter. The use 
of oral histories appears to have been limited to the identification of 
traditional fishing areas used by the Native American plaintiffs in the case. 
 
 The second case, United States v. Michigan,64 also involved a 
challenge by tribes to the regulation of their off-reservation fishing 
activities by the state. The opinion specifically names three plaintiff 
witnesses: an ethnohistorian,65 and two anthropologists. The Michigan 
court dedicated a paragraph to each of these witnesses, describing their 
qualification as an expert, and in one case, criticizing the defense’s 
attempt to impeach the plaintiffs’ anthropologist. While testimony 
regarding oral histories of the tribes involved was heard, the court fails to 
mention any of these witnesses by name. In fact, the court gives only two 
lines in the opinion to recognize the Native American witnesses who 
appeared for the plaintiff United States and tribes: “The oral testimony of 
the tribal witnesses educated in the history and customs of their people by 
tribal elders is found to be reasonable and credible factual data regarding 
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2. Cultural Resource Cases 
 
 Ironically, both of the cultural resource cases examined arose in the 
Ninth Circuit, the same circuit that found the Antiquities Act67 
unconstitutionally vague in United States v. Diaz,68 Both Bonnichsen v. 
United States and Fallon-Paiute Shoshone Tribe v. United States also 
involved the extremely old (8,300 to nearly 10,000 years old) remains of 
an individual male. 
 
 In Bonnichsen v. United States,69 the Ninth Circuit was hearing a 
challenge by tribes to a district court ruling that the remains of an 
individual, who died possibly as long as 9,200 years ago, were subject to 
the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (ARPA),70 not (NAGPRA). 
The lower court rejected the government’s determination that the 
individual was a Native American, and thus held that NAGPRA was 
inapplicable.71 
 
 In the lower court, the magistrate judge held that “reliance upon oral 
narratives under the circumstances presented here is highly problematic.” 
Even though the narratives were presented by an anthropologist, the 
lower court still found this evidence to be unreliable.  The district court’s 
ruling demonstrates that even when oral narrative evidence is presented 
by an anthropologist, who would have been qualified as an expert under 
the Daubert standard, acceptance of the evidence by the court is not a 
foregone conclusion. It must be concluded that the court, despite the 
involvement of an anthropologist, finds the underlying material from which 
the anthropologist draws his conclusions, the oral narratives themselves, 
to be defectively unreliable. The court instead used archaeological and 
radiocarbon dating evidence to find there were sufficient gaps in the 
chronological record, which the court concluded showed a lack of cultural 
affiliation between the remains and the tribal claimants. 
 
 The second case, Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe v. United States,72 
is factually similar to the Bonnichsen case, also involving the remains of 
an individual of similar age and described as “an extremely ancient 
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habitant of Northern Nevada.”73 However, the United States District Court 
noted neither the tribe, nor the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), had 
raised the issue of whether the individual was a Native American. 
Therefore, the Bonnichsen cases, and the determination that ARPA rather 
than NAGPRA was applicable to a skeleton of this antiquity, were not 
controlling.74 The Tribe argued that the BLM did not take into account 
scientific evidence it presented,75 while the BLM argued it could rely on its 
own experts.76 The Tribe retained its own experts and provided the BLM 
with the evidence it had gathered, at which point the Tribe claims it was 
shut out of the process for determining the affiliation of the remains.77 The 
Tribe provided additional evidence when the issue was presented to the 
NAGPRA Review Committee, which issued a non-binding advisory 
opinion stating that the tribe was affiliated with the remains.78 The court 
acknowledged the BLM’s right to believe its expert, but noted that position 
“does not leave the BLM free to ignore other competing views by failing to 
recognize their existence and refusing to describe the reasons why they 
were not accepted.”79 This case was remanded to the BLM by the court 
after it found the determination the remains were culturally unaffiliated to 
be arbitrary and capricious. In remanding the case, the court instructed, 
“BLM is reminded that it must present cogent reasons for its findings, even 
when it is essentially choosing between two competing theories.”80 
 
C. Consideration of Oral History as an Interpretive Guidepost 
 
 Whether archaeologists should look to Native American oral 
traditions themselves is debated. Some archaeologists advocate using 
oral histories as a resource for interpreting archaeological findings, 
possibly giving the archaeological findings context.81 Others dismiss oral 
histories as not testable as an archaeological hypothesis,82 but 
“[n]evertheless, foolish or angelic archaeologists will continue to pick and 
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choose among the offerings of oral traditions.”83 Those archaeologists who 
question the value of oral histories and traditions and advocate not relying 
on them, are often the greatest proponents of archaeology as a scientific 
endeavor. These proponents argue that “[t]o preserve, let alone extend, 
the unparalleled power of science and systematic historiography to 
produce testable historical statements requires, like liberty, eternal 
vigilance.”84 The view of this position is that archaeologists are objective, 
truth-seeking scientists.85 
 
This position is contrasted by those who believe Native American 
oral histories and traditions not only have value, but can in fact be 
tested.86 For example, the examination of the remains of massacre victims 
by a physical anthropologist contradicted the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saint’s historic accounts of the event, and were more 
consistent with the accounts obtained through interviews of various 
parties, including Native Americans, done by United States Army officers 
within a couple of years of the event.87 In addition, Whiteley points to the 
presence of specific place names and locations in Hopi migration legends 
which could theoretically be tested archaeologically.88 Archaeologists 
holding this latter view often point to the classical archaeology where 
archaeological discoveries are compared to ancient Greek and Roman 
records,89 noting that field of study is “hardly lacking analytical vigor.”90 
The difference between the acceptance of Greek and Roman written 
records in classical archaeology versus the rejection of oral histories and 
traditions in prehistoric archaeology comes down to the method of 
recordation.91 Yet, many anthropologists who are willing to accept oral 
history and tradition as valid evidence believe it may be more accurate 
than written accounts of the same event.92 Of course, there exists the real 
possibility that no matter which source is being tested, Native American 
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oral history or written records of the dominant culture, the resulting data 
uncovered by scientists and their conclusions may disprove the very fact 
being investigated.93 
 
 It appears the one point archaeologists can agree on is that there is 
a schism in the field, based on an idea there are, at least, two ways to 
view and interpret the past,94 either through the examination of 
archaeological artifacts or through the learning of Native American oral 
narratives and histories, with the heart of the disagreement being the 
amount of weight and credibility to be given to which and whose 
interpretation.95 
 
II. NATIVE AMERICANS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES 
 
 The use of Native American tribal members in presenting 
testimonial evidence of their oral traditions may be accomplished in one of 
two ways: qualifying the tribal member as an expert witness or via a 
hearsay exception. 
 
A. An Elder as an Expert 
 
 A Native American can serve as an expert witness as to the tribe’s 
traditions, understanding and history, as shown in Cree v. Sandberg.96 
This case was an appeal by the State of Washington of a district court 
ruling that the Yakama Tribe’s treaty exempted the tribe from paying 
Washington’s truck license and permit fees. The Ninth Circuit upheld the 
exemption, noting the district court’s reliance on a tribal member’s 
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testimony as to the tribe’s understanding of the treaty language was not 
an abuse of discretion.97 
 
Qualifying a tribal member to be an expert witness is not outside 
the realm of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 702 allows for a witness 
to be qualified as an expert not only through scientific credentials, but also 
if the witness has specialized knowledge or experience.98 In examining 
Rule 702, authors have commented, “[t]here are no definite guidelines for 
determining the knowledge, skill or experience required either in a 
particular case or of a particular witness.”99 In Native American culture, it 
is often that only certain members of the tribe may know the “particulars of 
the territory, its mythological construction, and cultural uses.”100 In hearing 
evidence on matters related to Native Americans, courts should consider 
that certain tribal members, including elders, testifying as to their own oral 
traditions and history would be experts as they would have access to 
knowledge that may not generally be known.  Being able to include this 
knowledge in the evidentiary records clearly would be helpful to the trier of 
fact, which is the touchstone for the admissibility of expert testimony.101 
 
 Not all are so willing to find the testimony of tribal members, 
especially elders, as helpful in the search for truth. Mason, an 
anthropology professor, claims such testimony is biased because it 
“credits ‘elders’ with powers of memory credibility far beyond anything that 
would be granted anyone else.”102 Mason further attacks those identified 
as tribal elders as having “a credential with known power to disarm 
otherwise worldly scholars. . . a potential trap as likely constructed by the 
information seeker as by its giver.”103 
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 Expert testimony given by tribal members or elders faces the 
difficulty of meeting the Daubert factors described above.104 Clearly, the 
testimony being given by tribal elders is non-scientific in nature, versus 
testimony given by soft science anthropologists. How this would alter the 
application of Daubert is unclear. While the Supreme Court in Kumho tells 
the courts to apply the Daubert factors, the Kumho case, and some 
commentators, leaves open the possibility that “a court may have to 
consider factors other than those listed in Daubert.”105 Since the list of 
Daubert factors is “neither dispositive nor exhaustive,”106 some of the 
alternative factors that may be considered include “unjustified 
extrapolation … to an unfounded conclusion,”107 accounting for alternative 
explanations, and “whether the field of expertise … is known to reach 
reliable results.”108  
 
 The basis for an expert’s opinion testimony is governed by Federal 
Rule of Evidence 703. This rule sets forth three bases for expert 
testimony: personal knowledge, facts already in the record, and facts not 
in the record.109 The facts in the third category must be “of a type 
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions 
and inferences upon the subject.”110 The third category is noted to be 
controversial since the expert can base an opinion on facts not in the 
record, and could base that opinion on “facts [that] may be inadmissible 
hearsay.”111 Courts have defended the policy allowing this external basis 
for an expert opinion since the court believes “the expert is fully capable of 
judging for himself what is, or is not, a reliable basis for his opinion.”112 
 
 A tribal member’s expert opinion testimony about the tribe’s oral 
traditions and history would fall under this third basis. While the testimony 
about oral histories cannot be expected to “conform exactly to scientific 
models of falsifiability,”113 in other words, they cannot be subjected to a 
mechanical formula to prove their truth, there are cultural “canons for 
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evaluating truth-claims and appraising the plausibility of particular 
accounts of the past.”114 Whiteley gives the example of two stories, each 
about the migration of a particular Hopi clan to their present day location. 
These stories “are entrenched features of a corpus of Hopi narratives,” 
thus an individual who tells the stories incorrectly “would be dismissed as 
a know-nothing….”115 This process, which Whiteley describes as 
subjecting the account to “critical standards of historical judgment,”116 is 
the same process described by the United States v. Sims117 court as the 
expert’s own evaluation of a reliable basis. 
 
B. Making Use of Hearsay Exceptions 
 
 The other option for admitting testimony about Native American oral 
traditions in court is to use an existing hearsay exception that allows the 
admission of hearsay testimony to prove “reputation concerning 
boundaries or general history.”118 The text of the hearsay exception allows 
testimony going to the “[r]eputation in a community, arising before the 
controversy, as to boundaries of or customs affecting lands in the 
community, and reputation as to events of general history important to the  
community . . .”119 
 
 In order to better understand the exception, the notes of the 
advisory committee prove somewhat helpful. These notes show that this 
hearsay exception “is based upon the general admissibility of evidence of 
reputation as to land boundaries and land customs, expanded in this 
country to include private as well as public boundaries.”120 There is sparse 
modern case law on this hearsay exception. 
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In Rickert v. Thompson,121 the court held hearsay evidence was 
admissible to prove ancient boundaries. However, the advisory committee 
notes appear to restrict the applicability of the exception: “the reputation is 
required to antedate the controversy, though not to be ancient.”122 Thus, 
testimony by a tribal member may not be admissible for the controversies 
found in the Bonnichsen and Fallon Paiute-Shoshone cases, which 
involve human remains that are several millennia old. However, the term 
“ancient” is not defined in either the Federal Rules of Evidence or in the 
advisory committee notes. Therefore, testimony from tribal members 
about the tribe’s more recent oral history and traditions is still beneficial in 
establishing a presence in the area where remains are found so the tribe 
will be consulted upon the discovery of the remains123 and possibly to 
establish cultural affiliation with the remains.124 This is also important since 
past relocation or removal of tribes by the federal government may have 
resulted in a tribe being far removed from their aboriginal territory.125 In 
addition, prior to European contact, many tribes were highly mobile 
hunter-gathers, who moved across large territories to exploit available 
resources.126 This exception would have more applicability in cases where 
the subject of the controversy is not several millennia old, such as the 
treaty rights cases discussed above. 
 
Another example where testimony regarding oral history was 
important evidence is the Indian Claims Commission127 cases, although 
even in those cases, such testimony was sometimes given little or no 
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credit.128 In Wally v. United States,129 the court allowed testimony as to 
reputation about facts which were no longer available to individuals or 
other proof to show the location of ancient boundaries. An argument can 
therefore be made that the oral histories of tribes would qualify as 
testimony to prove the reputation of facts about past events that are 
known by the community as a whole, but are no longer available to 
individuals. Testimony about oral histories could provide information not 
only about the boundaries of aboriginal lands, but also regarding tribal 
activities such as hunting, fishing and gathering methods,130 and locations 
where those activities took place.131 
 
 Ironically, the exceptions to the hearsay rule reflect the preference, 
or perhaps bias, for written records, generally based upon the assumption 
that written records are a more correct and accurate reflection of an event 
than an oral statement, or as here, oral history. For example, exceptions 
to the hearsay rule exist for the records of religious organizations,132 
marriage and baptism certificates,133 and personal family histories 
contained in family Bibles.134 However, this is not surprising, since “[t]he 
law implicitly embodies the religious premises of the dominant culture.”135 
Therefore, since the nature of many Native American traditions, practices, 
and religious activities are foreign to the courts, it is not surprising that 
evidence rules which seem to favor records of Christian and other 
Western religions have a preferred position. This reality is described well 
by Whiteley: “the Bible’s very textuality enables it to be conceptualized as 
including history more easily than is the case with oral mythology, owning 
to the engrained – though largely unexamined – ideas about the supposed 
instability and unreliability of oral narratives in the Western cult of the 
written word.”136 In addition, other hearsay exceptions reflect this 
preference, in this case for history and science, in the existing exceptions 
for statements in ancient documents137 and learned treatises.138 
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III. BIAS AGAINST NATIVE AMERICAN ORAL HISTORY AND TRADITION 
 
 Judges wield great power in acting as gatekeepers on the 
admissibility of evidence and testimony, however, in being human, are 
influenced by their paradigm or worldview. Worse yet, the decisions of 
some judges reflect, directly or indirectly, discrimination and bias. Some 
jurists have written, “[t]he testimony of Native Americans in court provides 
compelling evidence of cultural practices.”139 However, the testimony of 
tribal members, especially regarding oral traditions and history, is not 
always met with the considerable respect as was the case in Cree v. 
Sandberg.140 There, the trial court considered Mr. William Yallup, a full-
blooded Yakama Indian, as the “ultimate expert” on the tribe’s 
interpretation of their treaty.141 Contrast that situation with the one in 
Pueblo de Zia v. United States,142 where the Indian Claims Commission 
“virtually ignored” oral accounts of history passed from father to son, 
despite the fact some of this oral history was corroborated by other 
documentary evidence.143 The Commissions’ reasoning: “all of these 
witnesses were young men (ages 47 to 59) who, in point of time, are far 
removed from the issue in question . . . .”144 The Court of Claims reversed 
and remanded, chastising the Commission for its treatment of the oral 
history testimony: “[s]uch evidence is entitled to some weight; it cannot be 
ignored or discarded as ‘literally worthless.’”145 Interestingly, the 
Commission also disregarded the historical and archaeological evidence 
that was offered in support of the oral history testimony in finding no claim. 
The Court of Claims disagreed, finding the “specific documentary 
corroborations and the general dovetailing . . . of [the] historical and 
archaeological evidence and [the] testimony”146 fulfilled the plaintiff tribes’ 
burden of proof in establishing aboriginal title to a tract of land outside the 
land granted to them by the federal government. 
 
 One series of cases that has been roundly criticized for appearing 
biased against Native American oral tradition and history is the 
Bonnichsen line of cases. The Ninth Circuit’s decision in the case has 
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been called by one commentator “the most lethal attack on Native 
American identity in recent American jurisprudence,”147 due to the district 
and appellate courts’ disregard of the oral history evidence. Much of the 
criticism of the decision is centered on Ninth Circuit’s focus on science in 
the case.148 The Ninth Circuit was critical of the Secretary of Interior’s use 
of oral history evidence, and noted the presence of gaps in the empirical 
record that precluded the Secretary’s finding of cultural affiliation between 
Kennewick Man and modern tribes. The court made this ruling despite the 
fact the regulations implementing NAGPRA specifically note that a finding 
of cultural affiliation is based on an “evaluation of the totality of the 
circumstances.”149 Thus, the Secretary’s use of the oral history evidence 
was valid under the regulations. Those same regulations dictate that a 
finding of cultural affiliation “should not be precluded solely because of 
some gaps in the record.”150 It appears from the Ninth Circuit’s holding 
that there is a point at which there are too many gaps in the record, 
however, the court fails to offer either a bright line rule or test that would 
produce consistent results in future situations or litigation. Without further 
discussion or clarification by the courts, the basic lesson drawn from the 
Bonnichsen line of cases is that science will tip the scales. Other 
commentators have reached the same conclusion. 
 
Ashley Young wrote, “the court’s analysis clearly reinforced the 
long-standing norm of the dominant society that science trumps 
culture.”151 Allison Dussias concurs with this view, noting the Native 
American’s “understandings of kinship, ancestry, and history were treated 
as uncivilized and unscientific, and therefore not entitled to respect from 
the dominant society and its judicial system.”152 The issue of courts 
accepting science over other forms of evidence is a problem that 
apparently Congress anticipated.  While prescribing a preponderance of 
the evidence standard, the regulations also state, “[c]laimants do not have 
to establish cultural affiliation with scientific certainty.”153 
 
Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s rejection of tribal oral histories in favor of 
more scientific evidence appears to conflict with Congress’ understanding 
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of the circumstances faced by tribes.154 S. Alan Ray writes that the 
problem was the court’s lack of a “conceptual scheme . . . to understand 
and take seriously the testimony of present-day members of tribal 
claimants.”155 Thus, because the oral histories failed to provide facts 
similar to modern historical studies, they were dismissed as 
unpersuasive.156 Commentators find this action to be contrary to 
Congress’s intent for NAGPRA, and that rather than discounting oral 
history testimony, Congress in fact viewed it as one of the “relevant types 
of evidence to be considered without indicating that it was to be given 
lesser weight than other forms of evidence.”157 In affirming the district 
court ruling, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Bonnichsen is seen as contrary 
to the prior acceptance of oral tradition and history in United States 
courts.158 The Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Bonnichsen, of course, was 
welcomed by the plaintiff scientists who felt the Army Corps of Engineers 
and Secretary of the Interior were “anti-science,”159 and others who object 
to the incorporative endorsement of minority religions that reject science 




 The issue of allowing testimony on Native American oral history 
and traditions in the courts is not easily resolved. The same issue has 
caused a schism among archaeologists themselves. This type of evidence 
has been treated differently depending upon the facts of the case and the 
court hearing it.  It is difficult to tell whether this is based on genuine 
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concerns by some courts over the reliability of the testimony, is the result 
of incompatibility based on the differences between the law and the 
evidence’s underlying cultural origins, or is simply the work of biased 
jurists. 
 
 One thing is certain: the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Bonnichsen 
muddied the already murky waters of the ambiguous language of 
NAGPRA. The clash between science and oral history was highlighted by 
this very public dispute. It resulted in calls for amendments to clarify the 
wording of several provisions in NAGPRA. And the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
in Bonnichsen has done little to put a definitive end to the debate: the 
decision has already been deemed not controlling in the Fallon Paiute-
Shoshone Tribe case being heard in the U.S. District Court in Nevada. 
 
 While the Indian Claims Commission is no longer, and the treaty 
rights cases referenced here were heard 30 years ago, there are certain to 
be additional non-cultural resource cases that will be heard by the federal 
courts, some which may involve the introduction of testimony on Native 
American oral tradition. It is clear that an argument can be made for 
allowing tribal elders themselves to testify, either using a hearsay 
exception, or by qualifying the tribal elder as an expert witness. Attorneys 
for tribes will need to be prepared to use one or both strategies to have 
oral history testimony allowed into litigation, especially if it is critical to the 
tribes’ arguments, as reflected in the treaty rights and cultural resources 
cases touched on here. 
 
 The Ninth Circuit in Bonnichsen showed that even oral history 
presented by an anthropologist was not necessarily more influential 
evidence than having it straight from the elders’ mouths. While the facts of 
Bonnichsen may have not been the best for a strong argument in support 
of oral traditions because of the age of the remains involved, the district 
court in the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe case was not as quick to 
dismiss the oral history evidence. 
 
 Considering the resurgence of tribes exercising their sovereign 
powers and with the support of the federal government’s position on tribes 
defining their own self identity, tribes are putting money, often gaming 
revenues, into programs preserving their culture, history and language. 
While some of this preservation may involve the writing down of narratives 
or interviews with tribal elders, it is likely traditional methods of passing 
information, through learning and listening of these narratives and 




knowledge from elders, will continue. With tribes’ increasing wealth due to 
gaming revenues, and their efforts to further broaden their economies, 
there will undoubtedly be more interaction between tribes and non-
Indians, some of which may result in litigation in the federal courts. A tribal 
attorney will have to be ready to muster the arguments if oral history 
testimony is needed, and will have to have some luck that the judge 
hearing the case was more like those in Cree v. Sandberg than those in 
Bonnichsen. 
